We introduce an arbitrage-free framework for robust valuation adjustments. An investor trades a credit default swap portfolio with a defaultable counterparty, but has incomplete information about her credit quality. By constraining the actual default intensity of the counterparty within an uncertainty interval, we derive both upper and lower bounds for the XVA process. We show that these bounds may be recovered as solutions of nonlinear ordinary differential equations. The presence of collateralization and closeout payoffs introduce fundamental differences relative to classical credit risk valuation. The superhedging value cannot be directly obtained by plugging one of the extremes of the uncertainty interval in the valuation equation, but rather depends on the relation between the XVA replicating portfolio and the close-out value throughout the life of the transaction.
Introduction
Dealers need to account for market inefficiencies related to funding and credit valuation adjustments when marking their swap books. Those include the capital needed to support the trading position, the losses originating in case of a premature default by either of the trading parties, and the remuneration of funding and collateral accounts. It is common market practice to refer to these costs as the XVA of the trade. Starting from 2011, major dealer banks have started to mark these valuation adjustments on their balance sheets; see, for instance, Cameron (2014) and Beker (2015) .
A large body of literature has studied the implication of these costs on the valuation and hedging of derivatives positions. Crépey (2015a) and Crépey (2015b) use backward stochastic differential equations to value the transaction, accounting for funding constraints and separating between positive and negative cash flows which need to be remunerated at different interest rates. Brigo and Pallavicini (2014) postulates the existence of a risk-neutral pricing measure, and obtain the valuation equation which accounts for counterparty credit risk, funding, and collateral servicing costs. Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014) construct a semimartingale framework and provide the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) representation for the wealth process that replicates a default-free claim, assuming the trading parties to be default-free. Building on Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014) , Nie and Rutkowski (2018) study the pricing of contracts both from the perspective of the investor and her counterparty, and provide the range of fair bilateral prices. The default risk of the trading parties involved in the transaction is accounted for by Burgard and Kjaer (2011b) , who derive the partial differential equation representations for the derivative value, using replication arguments. Andersen et al. (2017) view funding costs from a corporate finance perspective. They develop a model that is consistent with asset pricing theories, and importantly account for the impact of funding strategies on the market valuation of the claim. We refer to Crépey et al. (2014) for an overview of the literature on valuation adjustments.
We consider a market environment, in which the investor transacts credit default swaps with a counterparty and wants to compute the XVA of her trading position. The trading inefficiencies contributing to the XVA include funding costs due to the difference between treasury borrowing and lending rates, losses originating if the investor or her counterparty default prematurely, and costs of posting initial and variation margin collateral. The distinguishing feature of our framework, relative to the literature surveyed above, is that the investor is uncertain about the credit quality of her counterparty and hence unable to compute the actual XVA. As highlighted by European Banking Authority (2015) , over 75% of the counterparties do not have liquid CDS quotes (see also Gregory (2015) ). An approach to deal with missing quotes is to map a counterparty lacking liquidly quoted CDS spreads to the most similar counterparty for which a liquid market of such quotes exists. The criteria used to define similarity between counterparty credit qualities is typically based on regions, sector, and ratings data, but often exhibits arbitrariness and the resulting estimates have significant errors (Brummelhuis and Zhongmin (2017) ).
We develop a framework of robust pricing for a credit default swap portfolio, that we refer to as the uncertain intensity model. A recent work by Fadina and Schmidt (2018) develops a framework that incorporates model uncertainty into defaultable term structure models. Similarly to us, they assume prior information about lower and upper bounds on the default intensity, but their focus is on deriving intervals of defaultable bond prices, ignoring valuation adjustments. Our theory parallels that for uncertain volatility introduced by Avellaneda et al. (1995) . Therein, the authors consider a Black-Scholes type model, in which the volatility of the underlying asset is unknown and only a priori deterministic bounds for its value are prescribed. They derive the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation characterizing the value of European options in this model; see also Lyons (1995) for the case of one-dimensional barrier options. Fouque and Ning (2017) generalize the analysis to the case that the volatility fluctuates between two stochastic bounds, arguing that this better captures the behavior of options with longer maturity. Other related works include Hobson (1998) , El Karoui et al. (2009) , and Denis and Martini (2006) who provide a probabilistic description using the theory of capacities. Another line of subsequent work, building on the uncertain volatility model, is the theory of G-Brownian motion and G-expectation by Peng (2007) .
The most critical source of uncertainty in counterparty risk environments is the default risk of the investor's counterparty. Hence, we focus on the impact that the uncertainty in the counterparty default intensity has on the valuation of the trade, rather than analyzing the implications of uncertainty in the volatility of the underlying. Using the intensity uncertainty interval, we compute the upper and lower bounds for the XVA. There are both similarities and differences between our setup and the uncertain volatility setup of Avellaneda et al. (1995) . On the one hand, the differential equations yielding the robust XVA price process are ordinary and of the first order, as opposed to the case of uncertain volatility in which the price bounds are obtained by solving second-order partial differential equations. Additional simplifications arise because we do not need to deal with the singularity of probability measures. On the other hand, new technical challenges are introduced due to the complex relationship between the valuation of the hedging portfolio, the determination of collateral levels, and the close-out requirements of the valuation party.
In our framework, the investor uses risky bonds underwritten by herself, her counterparty, and the reference entities, to replicate the XVA process associated with the credit default swaps transaction. There are several reasons behind our choices of using bonds as hedging instruments. First, it is well known (see, for instance, Gregory (2015) ) that the vast majority of banks' counterparties do not have liquidly traded CDSs. A clear example is the municipal bond market that, unlike the corporate bond market, has not sufficiently fostered the development of the corresponding CDS market (Fabozzi and Feldstein (2008) ). The bankruptcy events experienced by municipal entities in recent years, such as the city of Detroit, increased pressure on municipal bond investors and exchanged traded funds specializing in municipal bonds to heighten risk management. The most direct instruments to hedge against this risk are the single name credit default swaps. However, the market for credit default swaps is still very thin compared to the primary market of municipal bonds. According to Van Deventer (2014) , only 11 municipal CDSs have traded since the DTCC began reporting weekly trading activities in July 2010. 1 Second, a problem typically encountered when one considers CDS based replication strategies is that each CDS contract will be on-the-run only for the first three months after its issuance. After these three months, the CDS will change its status to off-the-run and become very illiquid. We thus opt for bonds as hedging instruments because they are typically easier to trade at any time prior to maturity than the corresponding off-the-run CDSs. 2 We derive the nonlinear valuation equation that uses corporate bonds to replicate the credit default swap position, and take into account counterparty credit risk and closeout payoffs exchanged at default. Our valuation equation is a special BSDE driven by Lévy processes, that contains jump-to-default but no diffusion terms. We characterize the super-hedging price of the transaction as the solution to a nonlinear system of ODEs, that is obtained from the nonlinear BSDE tracking the XVA process, after projecting such as BSDE onto the smaller filtration exclusive of credit events information. The system consists of an ODE, whose solution is the value of the transaction cash flows ignoring market inefficiencies, and additional ODEs that yield the XVA of the portfolio. Intuitively, the superhedging price is the value attributed to the trade by an investor who positions herself in the worst possible economic scenario. We find that the superhedging price and the corresponding superhedging strategies may not be recovered by simply plugging one of the extremes of the uncertainty interval into the valuation equation. This constitutes a crucial difference from the case of uncertain volatility, where it is well known that the price of a call or a put option under the worst-case scenario is obtained by plugging the upper extreme of the volatility uncertainty interval into the Black-Scholes formula; see, for example, Pham (2009) . The difference in our setting is that both the collateral and the close-out value depend on exogenous, publicly observed, parameters, while the XVA hedging process is based on quantities such as the investor's borrowing and lending rates, that are specific to the trader implementing the super-replicating XVA hedging strategy. Our analysis indicates that, depending on the relation between the current value of the XVA hedge and the close-out value of the transaction, the lower or higher extreme of the intensity uncertainty interval should be used in the super-hedging strategy. The trader always chooses the counterparty default intensity that maximizes her wealth process. For example, if the superhedge replicating the XVA strategy requires the investor to be short the counterparty's bond, i.e., a positive jump would arise at the counterparty default (this would be the case if the value of the XVA hedge process lies below the close-out value), then the trader would choose to use the largest possible value of the default intensity, and vice-versa.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We develop the market model in Section 2. We introduce the valuation measure, collateral process and close-out valuation in Section 3. We introduce the replicating wealth process and the notion of arbitrage in Section 4. We develop a robust analysis of the XVA process in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Model
Our framework builds on that proposed by Bichuch et al. (2017) in that it uses a reduced form model of defaults and maintains the distinction between universal and investor specific instruments. The model economy consists of N firms, indexed by i = 1, . . . , N , whose default events constitute the sources of risks in the portfolio. We use I and C to denote, respectively, the trader (also referred to as hedger or investor throughout the paper) executing the transaction and her counterparty. Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space rich enough to support the following constructions. We assume the existence of N +2 independent and identically distributed unit mean exponential random variables E i , i = 1, . . . , N, I, C. The default time of each firm i is defined to be the first time its cumulated intensity process exceeds the corresponding exponentially distributed random variable, i.e. τ i = sup t ≥ 0 :
. Accordingly, we use the default indicator process H i (t) = 1l {τ i ≤t} , t ≥ 0, to track the occurrence of firm i's default. The background filtration F := F t t≥0 , where F t := σ H j (u); u ≤ t : j ∈ {1, .., N } , contains information about the risk of the portfolio, i.e., of the default of the N firms referencing the traded securities, but not about the defaults of the investor I and her counterparty C. The default intensity processes h P i (t) t≥0 , i ∈ {1, ..., N, I, C}, are constructed so that they are adapted to the background filtration F, i.e., the default intensity at a given time t depends on the firms' defaults occurring before time t. To achieve this, we use the following stepwise procedure: Assume h
is the time of the first default (the first order statistics). For k ≥ 1, chooseh
,∞) (t), where we use the notation τ k (i) to denote the i-th order statistics of the k-level stopping time τ k i . Then we define τ k i := sup t ≥ 0 :
In this way, the intensity h P,k i agrees with h P,k−1 i up to the k-th default, but accounts for information of the k-the default thereafter. Finally, we define the full filtration F as
. We denote the filtration containing information about the investor and counterparty defaults by H = H t t≥0 , where H t = σ H j (u); u ≤ t : j ∈ {I, C} . By construction, the default intensities h P i , i ∈ {1, .., N, I, C}, are piecewise deterministic functions of time (we thus work in the framework of piecewise-deterministic Markov processes, see Davis (1984) ). We furthermore require that they are piecewise continuous and uniformly bounded. The enlarged filtration, including both portfolio risk (default events of the N firms referencing portfolio securities) and counterparty risk (default events of investor and her counterparty), is denoted by G = G t ) t≥0 = F t ∨ H t t≥0 . We will consider the augmented filtrations, i.e., the smallest complete and right-continuous filtrations, and denote them by F, H, G (with a slight abuse of notation). For future purposes, we define the martingale compensator processes i,P of H i as
By construction, these compensator processes are F-martingales for i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, and G-martingales for i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C}. We take the perspective of a valuation party, responsible for determining the price of the trade and its collateral requirements. The valuation party has full information on the default intensities h P i , i ∈ {1, ..., N }, of the firms referencing the traded portfolio. The hedger is fully informed on the portfolio market risk (default risk of the firms in the portfolio) and she clearly knows her own default intensity h P I . However, she only has limited information about the actual default intensity h P C = (h P C (t)) t≥0 of her counterparty, and in particular only knows its upper and lower bound, i.e.,
Hedging instruments
The goal is for the investor to hedge a portfolio of credit default swaps (CDS) written on N different reference entities, denoted by 1, 2, . . . , N . All CDSs are assumed to mature at the same time T . The credit risk exposure associated with this portfolio is hedged using both universal and investor specific instruments. The universal instruments are available to all market participants, while the investor specific instruments are accessible solely to the hedger and not to other market participants. The universal instruments include (defaultable) bonds underwritten by the reference entities in the credit default swaps portfolio as well as by the trader and her counterparty. Under the physical measure P, for i = 1, . . . , N, I, C, and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the dynamics of the defaultable bond price processes with zero recovery at default are given by
where µ i , i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C}, are constant return rates. The investor specific instruments include the funding and collateral account of the hedger. We assume that the trader lends and borrows from her treasury desk at, possibly different, rates r 
where 
The collateral amount M t received or posted at time t will be determined by a valuation party, as discussed in the next section. Figure 1 describes the mechanics of the entire flow of transactions.
Valuation Measure, Collateralization and Close-out
We take the perspective of a trader who purchases a portfolio of credit default swaps, and determine its value by constructing a replicating portfolio. Such a portfolio uses bonds of the underlying reference entities to hedge away the market risk of the transaction, and bonds of the trading parties to hedge against counterparty risk of the trading parties. Hence, from a corporate perspective, we are interested in the entrance price of the transaction. Because the trader does not know the exact default intensity of her counterparty, such a replication argument can only provide price bounds. In particular, the lower bound provides a reliable benchmark to measure the potential losses incurred if the portfolio is acquired at a higher price. Next, we discuss public and private valuations. Private valuations are based on discount rates, which depend on investor specific characteristics, while public valuations depend on publicly available discount factors. Specifically, public valuations are needed for the determination of collateral requirements and the close-out value of the transaction. They are determined by a valuation agent who might be either one of the parties involved in the transaction or a third party, in accordance with market practices reviewed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). The valuation agent determines the closeout value of the transaction by calculating the so-called clean price of the derivative, using the discount rate r D and the default intensities of the firms in the portfolio, h P i , i ∈ {1, . . . N }, that are known to the valuation agent. Throughout the paper, we will use the superscript ∧ when referring specifically to public valuations.
The hedging process will stop before maturity if the hedger or her counterparty were to default prematurely. We thus define the terminal time of the hedge (i.e., the earliest between the default time of either party or the maturity T of the transaction) as τ := τ I ∧ τ C ∧ T . The valuation done by the agent is mathematically represented as pricing the trade under the valuation measure Q associated with the publicly available discount rate r D chosen by the agent. The measure Q is equivalent to P and their relation is specified by the Radon-Nikodým density The Q-dynamics of the defaultable bonds can be derived using Girsanov's theorem and are given by
, where
) are (F, Q)-martingales. They can be represented explicitly as
)du where the processes h
. . , N, I, C, being the rate of returns of the bonds underwritten by the reference entities, trader and her counterparty) are the firms' default intensities under the valuation measure and assumed to be positive.
Collateral
The public valuation process of the credit default swap portfolio, as determined by the valuation agent, is given byV
whereĈ i (t) is the time t value of the credit default swap referencing entity i. The variables z i indicate if the trader sold the swap to her counterparty (z i = 1) or purchased it from her counterparty (z i = −1). In the case the swap is purchased, the trader pays the spread times the notional to her counterparty, and receives the loss rate times the notional at the default time of the reference entity, if it occurs before the maturity T . This is the so-called "clean price", and does not account for credit risk of the counterparty, collateral or funding costs. Clearly, the public valuation of the portfolio is just the sum of the valuation of the individual CDSs.
Consistently with market practices, the collateralization process consists of two parts, the initial margin and the variation margin. The variation margin is just set to be a fixed ratio of the public valuation of the portfolio, while the initial margin is designed to mitigate the gap risk and is calculated using value at risk. Such a risk measure is set to cover a number of days of adverse price/credit spread movements for the portfolio position with a target confidence level. 4 Note that there is an important difference between initial and variation margins. Variation margins are always directional and can be rehypotecated (i.e., it flows from the paying party to the receiving party; the latter may use it for investment purposes), whereas initial margins have to be posted by both parties and need to be kept in a segregated account, thus they cannot used for hedging or portfolio replication. Moreover, we assume that collateral is posted and received in the form of cash, which is practically the most common form of collateral. 5 Thus, on the event that neither the trader nor her counterparty have defaulted by time t, and the reference entities in the portfolio have not all defaulted, the collateral process is defined as
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the collateralization level, δ > 0 is the delay in collateral posting, q is the level of risk tolerance and β is stress factor. The case α = 0 corresponds to zero collateralization, while α = 1 means that the transaction is fully collateralized. The positive part of the value at risk quantity captures the fact that initial margins cannot be re-hypothecated. Hence, the wealth process associated with the hedger's trading strategy does not include received initial margins.
Close-out value of transaction
We follow the risk-free closeout convention in the case of default by the hedger or her counterparty. According to this convention, each party liquidates the position at the market value when the other trading counterparty defaults. Hence, the value of the replicating portfolio will coincide with the third party valuation if the amount of available collateral is sufficient to absorb all occurred losses. If this is not the case, the trader will only receive a recovery fraction of her residual position, i.e., after netting losses with the available collateral. Let us denote by θ the value of the replicating portfolio at τ < T . This is given by
is the value of the claim at default netted of the posted collateral, and 0 ≤ L I , L C ≤ 1 are the loss rates on the trader and counterparty claims, respectively. Alternatively, we can represent the value of the portfolio at default as
where we define
Note that θ I (V t , M t ) t≥0 and θ C (V t , M t ) t≥0 are also piecewise deterministic and piecewise continuous F-adapted processes.
Wealth process & Arbitrage
We consider a stylized model of single name credit default swaps, and view all exchanged cash flows from the point of view of the protection seller. If the trader purchases protection from her counterparty against the default of the i-th firm, then the trader makes a stream of continuous payments at a rate S i of the notional to her counterparty, up until contract maturity or the arrival of the credit event, whichever occurs earlier. Upon arrival of the default event of the i-th firm, and if this occurs before the maturity T , the protection seller pays to the protection buyer the loss on the notional, obtained by multiplying the loss rate L i by the notional. As the notional enters linearly in all calculations, we fix it to be one.
Recall that ξ i denotes the number of shares of the bond underwritten by the reference entity i, ξ f the number of shares in the funding account, and we use ξ I and ξ C to denote the number of shares of trader and counterparty bonds, respectively. Using the identity (4), we may write the wealth process as a sum of contributions from each individual account:
For the purpose of arbitrage-free valuation, it is important to consider not only the actual CDS portfolio, but an arbitrary multiple of it. Hence, we will consider a multiple γ of the acquired portfolio, and focus on self-financing strategies.
Definition 4.1. A collateralized trading strategy
The above expression takes into account the spread payments received/paid by the investor for all CDS contracts which she sold to (resp. purchased from) her counterparty. The set of admissible trading strategies consists of F-predictable processes ϕ such that the portfolio process V t (γ) is bounded from below (cf. Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006) ). Bielecki et al. (2008) where the spread payments are used to increase the positions in the CDS instruments. The difference stems from the fact that, in their model, the CDS contracts are liquidly traded hedging instruments, whereas in our case they are part of the portfolio to be replicated.
Remark 4.2. Note that the spread payments received by the trader are continuously reinvested into the hedging instruments (risky bonds) or deposited in the funding account. This is a different setup then that in
Before discussing the arbitrage-free valuation of the CDS portfolio, we have to clarify the assumptions under which the underlying market is free of arbitrage from the hedger's perspective (conceptually, we follow (Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2014 , Section 3)). Thus, to start with, we exclude the CDS instruments from our consideration, and consider a trader who is only allowed to buy or sell defaultable bonds (written on the reference entities, her counterparty or the investor's firm itself) and to borrow or lend money from the treasury desk. 
If the market does not admit hedger's arbitrage for a given level x ≥ 0 of initial capital, the market is said to be arbitrage free from the hedger's perspective.
We impose the following assumption and argue that it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the absence of arbitrage. Having argued about the necessity in the above remark, we show that Assumption 4.4 is also sufficient to guarantee that the underlying market (i.e., excluding the credit default swap securities) is free of arbitrage. The proof proceeds along very similar lines as Proposition 4.4 in Bichuch et al. (2017) , and is delegated to the appendix. As in Bichuch et al. (2017) , we will define the notion of an arbitrage free price of a derivative security from the hedger's perspective. We assume that the hedger has zero initial capital, or equivalently, she does not have liquid initial capital that can be used for hedging the claim until maturity. The hedging portfolio will thus be entirely financed by purchases/sales of the risky bonds via the funding account. Let V t represent the price process of the replicating portfolio, and given by the supremum over all arbitrage free prices. Then we define the total valuation adjustment XVA as the difference between this upper arbitrage price and the clean price, i.e.,
XVA thus quantifies the total costs (including collateral, funding, and counterparty risk related costs) incurred by the trader to hedge the sold CDS portfolio. Notice that, at time t, the investor does not know the exact default intensity of the counterparty h P C for the time interval [t, τ ] . Hence, she is not able to execute the replication strategy yielding the value process V , because all what she knows about the default intensity is that h C ≤ h P C ≤ h C . Therefore, she will have to consider the worst case, accounting for all possible F-predictable dynamics of the default intensity process in the interval h C , h C . Denote the valuation of the replicating portfolio when h P C = h by V h . The robust XVA is defined as rXVA t (γ) = ess sup
Notice that the supremum is taken over all admissible valuations only prior to the occurrence of the hedger or her counterparty's default. In particular, the default time τ does not depend on the default intensity interval h C , h C capturing the uncertainty of the investor.
Robust XVA for Credit Swaps
In this section, we derive explicit representations for the robust XVA of a credit default swap portfolio.
To highlight the main mathematical arguments and economic implications of the results, we start analyzing the case of a single credit default swap in Section 5.1. We develop a comparison argument to establish the uniqueness of the robust XVA process and of the corresponding superhedging strategies in Section 5.2. We provide an explicit computation of margins under the proposed framework in Section 5.3. We generalize the analysis to a portfolio of credit default swaps in Section 5.4.
BSDE representation of XVA
This section characterizes the XVA process given in Eq. (9) as the solution to a BSDE. We start analyzing the dynamics of the process V t (γ). Given a self financing strategy, the investor's wealth process in (8) under the risk neutral measure Q follows the dynamics
Setting Z 1,γ t
and using Eq. (7), we obtain that
We may then rewrite the wealth dynamics as
To study the robust hedging strategy, we use the above dynamics to formulate the BSDE associated with the portfolio replicating the credit default swap. This is given by
where the driver f :
In the above expression, we highlight the dependence on the collateral process M that is used to mitigate the default losses associated with the γ units of the traded CDS contract. In the case the reference entity defaults before the investor or her counterparty, τ 1 < τ , the terminal condition is given by the loss term −γL 1 . This is consistent with the fact that, at this time, the value of the transaction from the hedger's point of view corresponds with the third party valuation γV
By positive homogeneity of the driver f with respect to γ > 0, we will assume that γ = 1 throughout the paper and suppress it from the superscript. The case γ = −1 follows from symmetric arguments. Next, we study the dynamics of the credit default swap price processV , viewed from the valuation agent's perspective. Such a process satisfies a BSDE that can be derived similarly to Eq. (15) (essentially ignoring the terms Z I , Z C as well as the collateral terms, setting r − f = r + f = r D , and normalizing γ = 1). This is given by
This BSDE is well known to admit the unique solution (V t ,Ẑ 1 t ), whereV can be represented explicitly (see the Appendix) aŝ
We immediately obtain a BSDE for the XVA process given by
and
Above, we have used the fact thatẐ 1 t = L 1 −V t− = L 1 −V t by stochastic continuity and thus
We can now apply the reduction technique developed by Crépey and Song (2015) to find a continuous ordinary differential equation describing the XVA prior to the investor and her counterparty's default.
Proposition 5.1. The BSDE 
The uniqueness of the solution to the original BSDE for V as well as to their projected versions in the F-filtration follows from the definition of XVA.
Corollary 5.2. The BSDE (15) admits a unique solution. This solution is related to the unique solutionŪ of the ODE
in the filtration F with
the following relations. On the one hand
U t := V t∧(τ ∧τ 1 )−
is a solution to the reduced BSDE (26), while on the other hand a solution to the full BSDE (15) is given by
Using the above representation, we can provide explicit representations for the replication strategies of the XVA. We will use the tilde symbol ( ) to denote these replicating strategies (e.g.,ξ 1 ,ξ I ,ξ C denote, respectively, the number of shares of the bond underwritten by the reference entity, trader and her counterparty) so to distinguish them from the strategies used to replicate the CDS price process. Using the martingale representation theorem for the probability space (Ω, F, F, Q) and bond price dynamics, we obtain thatξ
Invoking Theorem 5.1 along with equations (12) and (20) we conclude that
and from equations (4) and (6) it follows that
Finally, using Eq. (13) and the identity V t = XV A t +V t , we obtaiñ
where in the last equality above, we have used the definition of XVA given in Eq. (9) together with the identity XVA t =Ǔ t on {τ ∧ τ 1 > t}. Note that the hedging strategies are specified only in terms of bond prices and are thus known to the hedger at time t. However, they neither give information on the value of the XVA process nor on the evolution of the hedging strategy, because the default intensity process h Q C is unknown to the hedger.
Comparison and Superhedging
This section develops a comparison principle for the reduced BSDE (22) solves by the XVA process. We subsequently use this result to construct a superhedging strategy for the XVA.
The BSDE given in Eq. (22) is effectively an ODE. To maintain consistency with the theory of ODEs, we switch the direction of time by definingv(t) :=V T −t and m(t) := M T −t . It follows from Eq. (18) thatv is bounded, i.e., |v| ≤ M 0 for some constant M 0 . Similarly, setǔ(t) =Ǔ T −t . Applying the reduction technique of Crépey and Song (2015) to Eq. (17), similarly to how it was done above in Proposition 5.1, we get
We may then rewrite Eq. (22) as
Taken together, the two ODES (32) and (33) constitute a system of ODEs. The functions h
, are all piecewise (deterministic) continuous. The following theorem, whose proof is reported in the appendix, provides an existence and uniqueness result.
Proposition 5.3. There exists a unique (piecewise) classical solutions to the system of ODEs (32)-(33).
Recall that the trader does not know the actual default intensity h P C (and thus h Q C ) of her counterparty. She only knows that this is lower than h Q C and higher than h Q C . The following comparison principle theorem, whose proof is reported in the appendix, will be used to find the superhedging price of the XVA.
Theorem 5.4 (Comparison Theorem). Assume that there exists h
C ≥ h C > 0 such that h C ≥ h Q C ≥ h C and
letǔ be the solution of ODE (33). Let
and define the drivers g * and g * by plugging the default intensities (h Q C ) * and (h Q C ) * into the expression ofǧ given by (23), i.e.,
Letǔ * andǔ * be the solutions to ODE (33) whereǧ is replaced by g * and g * respectively, i.e.,
Thenǔ * ≤ǔ ≤ǔ * .
The ODEs (34) may be understood as the credit risk counterparts of the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt PDEs for the uncertain volatility model; see Avellaneda et al. (1995) . The main difference between our study and theirs is that, in their paper, the uncertainty comes from the volatility which appears as a second order term in the differential operator. Hence, the indicator function specifying the value of volatility to use in the pricing formula depends on the second order derivative of the option price with respect to the underlying, i.e., the Gamma of the option. In our setting, the indicator function specifying the value of counterparty's default intensity to use depends on the relation between the current value of the XVA hedge and the close-out value. The value of the hedge jumps to the close-out value when the counterparty defaults. If the size of this jump is positive, i.e., the close-out value of the transaction is higher, then the trader needs to be short the counterparty's bond to hedge this jump-to-default risk. As the trader wants to consider the worst possible scenario for her hedge, she would choose the largest value of the counterparty's default intensity h C because this yields the largest rate of return on the counterparty bond that she holds. Vice-versa, if the jump is negative, the trader needs to be long the counterparty bond. Consequently, the trader would use the smaller counterparty's default intensity h C to account for the worst possible hedge scenario.
Our objective is to provide a tight upper bound for the XVA price process, because this would imply a tight superhedging price. We achieve this by connecting such a superhedging price to the rXVA defined in Eq. (10). Define the processǓ * t :=ǔ * (T − t). The following theorem shows that the rXVA coincides with the superhedging price, and additionally specifies the superhedging strategy. The latter is obtained by taking the strategy given in (27)-(31) and using the superhedging priceǓ * in place ofǓ .
Theorem 5.5. The robust XVA admits the explicit representation given by
and the corresponding superhedging strategies for rXVA are given by
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we verify that the expression of rXVA given in Eq. (35) is the smallest superhedging price. In the second part, we show that the strategy given in (36) is a superhedging strategy. This requires showing that the implementation of this strategy does not require any cash infusion, and that the wealth process controlled by this strategy is exactly the rXVA process.
Define XVA
−V t , where we recall that V h t is the valuation process of the replicating portfolio obtained by setting the counterparty default intensity equal to h; see also the discussion before Eq. (10). First, note that XVA * t ≥ XVA h t . This follows directly from Theorem 5.4, which provides a comparison result for theǓ t term on the right hand side of the XVA expression in (25), noting that the two closeout terms are just independent of h. Hence, the right hand side of Eq. (35) is smaller than the left hand side: the latter represents a specific Fpredictable intensity process satisfying the boundary conditions, while the former is the supremum over all such intensity processes. This shows that the left side of Eq. (35) is less or equal than the right side. To show the reverse inequality, i.e., that the left side of Eq. (35) is greater or equal than the right side, we note that the family (XVA
we can define h directly by setting h (s) := h (s)1l
A + h (s)1l A c for s ≥ t and h (s) = 0, for 0 ≤ s < t. Such a process is clearly F s -measurable because A is F tmeasurable. As the essential supremum of an upward directed set can be written as monotone limit (see (Föllmer et al., 2004, Theorem A.32) ), lim n→∞ XVA h (n) = rXVA. Thus, as the countable union of nullsets is still a nullset we have that, for all t, rXVA t is smaller or equal than the right side of Eq. (35).
Next, we provide the expressions for the superhedging strategies. These are derived by replacinǧ U t withǓ * t into equations (27)- (31). Using the hedging strategies defined in (36), we obtain that, on the set {t < τ }, the value of the hedging portfolio at time t is
On the set {t < τ }, the change in value of the portfolio is
Additionally, for the hedging strategy (27)- (31) to be self-financing, we need to include the cash flow
The presence of this cash flow is due to the fact that the clean valuationV is computed using the publicly available discount rate r D , while the private valuation V is obtained using the funding rate r f . Such a cash flow needs to be accounted for in the implementation of the superhedging strategy. Taken together, equations (38) and (39) describe the change in value of the superhedging portfolio. Next, we compare it with the change in value of the robust XVA process given by
Using the fact that
it follows that (38) together with (39) dominate (40) from above, i.e.,
The above computations were done on the set {t < τ }. At the stopping time τ it can be easily checked that bothǓ and the superhedging portfolio are zero. Together with (41) and Theorem 5.4, it follows that the superhedging portfolio dominatesǓ for all times t.
We notice that if we use the robust superhedging strategies given in (36) and start with an initial capital rXVA 0 , then there will be no tracking error in the sense of El Karoui et al. (1998) . In other words, the error committed for implementing the robust strategy ξ 1,
in the real market (where the default intensity of the counterparty is h Q C ) instead of the robust market model (where default intensity is (h Q C ) * ) is zero. This may be understood as follows: Eq. (37) shows that the value of the superhedging portfolio is always rXVA. However, until the earliest among the default time of the counterparty, hedger, or maturity of the CDS contract, whichever comes first, the superhedging portfolio keeps generating profits because the change in the value of the superhedging portfolio is greater than the change in the value of theǓ * , as shown in (41). In other words, during a time interval dt, the hedger pockets an extra cash (h
at any time prior to the end of the replication strategy.
The robust strategies depend only on the XVA price process and the bond prices, and are independent of the default intensity h Q C , the value of which is unknown to the hedger. 
as a function of time. In the left panel, the default intensity at which we switch between the sub-and super-solutions is the crossing point of the dashed and dotted lines with the x-axis, that occurs at approximately t = 2.67. In the right panel, the third party valuationv becomes positive at approximately t = 1.83.
In the case of zero margins, it follows directly from Eq. (20) that the third party valuationv = v + −v − may be expressed in terms of the closeout value, and given by −θ
. Hence, we deduce from the right panel of Figure 2 that the third party valuation is negative prior to t = 1.83, and positive for t > 1.83. Figure 2 also shows that the superhedging strategy is non-trivial in the sense that it is not monotone in the default intensity. As it can be seen from the right panel of Figure  2 , the quantityθ C (v, 0) −ǔ is zero at t 0 ≈ 2.67, non-negative for t < t 0 , and strictly negative for t > t 0 . This implies that h Q C (t) = h C 1l {0≤t≤t 0 } + h C 1l {t 0 <t≤3} . In other words, prior to t 0 the trader will use the largest value of the intensity h C for her superhedging portfolio because the jump of the superhedging portfolio to the close-out value when the counterparty defaults, given byθ C (v, 0) −ǔ, is positive. After time t 0 , the trader will choose the smallest value h C of the default intensity because this jump would be negative. This is directly visibile from the right panel of Figure 2 , because the dashdotted line dominates the solid one. This analysis highlights a fundamental difference with respect to standard credit risk settings, that often ignore collateralization and close-out terms, or models for XVA in which collateralization and close-out value depend on the hedger's valuation process V itself as in Nie and Rutkowski (2016) . In these cases, the price of the derivative is monotone in the default intensity, while in our setting the value of the superhedging portfolio does not necessarily have this monotonicity property. This is due to the fact that the collateralization and closeout process are exogenous, i.e., they depend on the external valuationV of the third party, rather than on the value V of the superhedging portfolio.
Computation of Margins
We develop an explicit expression for the initial margins when the two parties trade γ units of a single name credit default swap contract. Initial margins are determined using the value-at-risk criterion, and need to be computed under the physical measure P as opposed to the valuation measure Q. By the definition of V aR, we have
Thus, differently from the variation margin V M (γ) = αγV t 1l {τ ∧τ (N ) >t} that is linear in γ, the initial margin IM (γ) is only positively homogeneous in γ. We will therefore distinguish the cases γ = 1 and γ = −1. Note first that
otherwise.
The case γ = 1 is less frequently observed in practice. We typically expect L 1 > S 1 T , as a protection buyer is unlikely to pay more than what he would receive in the event of a default (notice that S 1 T is the maximum payment the buyer would make). In this case, the exposure of the protection seller to the protection buyer would be negative, resulting in negative V aR. In the case γ = −1, we obtain
Because the right hand side of Eq. (43) is continuous and increasing in K, the inequality (42) that characterizes the initial margins becomes an equality, and thus the V aR can be numerically evaluated.
Example 5.6. Assume constant default intensities and t < T − δ. To calculate the initial margin IM
γ t for γ = −1, we note that
Therefore, the value of K solving the above equation, i.e., the initial margin, is explicitly given by
The initial margin formula ( 
Credit Swap Portfolios
In this section, we generalize the analysis conducted in the previous sections to a portfolio of single name credit default swaps, each referencing a different entity. To capture direct default contagion, we let the default intensities of surviving entities depend on past defaults. Throughout the section, we use the superscript (J), J ⊂ {1, ..., N }, to denote the set of already defaulted entities, while the other entities in J c := {1, ..., N }\J are all alive. For instance, V (J) denotes the replicating process of the CDS portfolio when all the entities in the set J have defaulted, and all entities in the set J c have not.
We denote by τ (J) the last default time of a reference entity in J (i.e., τ (J) = max j∈J τ j , assuming max j∈J τ j < τ i , i ∈ J), and for i ∈ J we use τ
to denote the default time of the i-th reference entity in the economic scenario where all reference entities in J have defaulted.
First, we study the dynamics of the third party valuation processV . Note that if all entities have defaulted, thenV ({1,...,N )} = 0. The case when all entities except for i have already defaulted, that is J = {1, ..., N }\{i} (in this case τ
, is analogous to the case of a single CDS contract, whose price process has been given in Eq. (17). Hence −dV
Next, we provide an inductive relation which relates the investor's wealth price process in the state where all entities in J have defaulted, to that in the state where the reference entity i ∈ J additionally defaults. The base case |J| = N − 1 has been given in (46). For the case |J| < N − 1, we obtain −dV
T ∧min j∈J c τ
Proceeding along the lines of Section 5, we can obtain a BSDE for the XVA process specified in Eq. (9) 
Next, we present the multi-dimensional extension of Theorem 5.4. The proof presents an additional induction step compared with the proof of Theorem 5.4, and the details are reported in the appendix. and letǔ (J) be the solution of ODE (57). Let
and define g * and g * plugging (h
Finally, letǔ (J), * be the solution to ODE (57), but withǧ replaced by g * , that is
and similarly, letǔ
be the solution of ODE (57) where we replaceǧ with g * . Thenǔ
It now remains to find the superhedging strategy for the robust XVA process. Following similar arguments to those used above, the strategy will be obtained by pasting together the various quantities associated with different subsets J of defaulted entities.
Theorem 5.10. The robust XVA can be represented explicitly by
where the processǓ
The superhedging strategies for rXVA are obtained from the above conditional strategies as
together with the number of shares held in the collateral account given by
Proof. The proof that rXVA dominates XVA h for any h C ≤ h ≤ h C is done in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 5.5. To prove that the superhedging strategy is given by equations (63) and (64), fix J ⊂ {1, ..., N }. Then the value of the portfolio associated with this strategy at time t on the set
We expect that, as number of reference entities increases, so does the difference between subhedge and superhedge. This may be intuitively understood as follows. The terminal/closeout condition of the superhedge in the case of a single reference entity matches the terminal/closeout condition of the XVA. However, as shown in Theorem 5.10, in the case of a credit default swap portfolio where multiple reference entities appear, the terminal/closeout of the superhedge dominates that of the XVA. Thus, in the case of two reference entities, the terminal/closeout condition includes the jump to the closeout/terminal condition for the single reference entity case, in addition to the cash flows accumulated prior to default. It is thus expected that the difference between the superhedge and the XVA in the case of two reference entities is greater than the corresponding difference when the portfolio consists of a single CDS. Iterative this reasoning inductively, we conclude that the difference between the superhedge and the XVA grows as more CDS contracts are added to the portfolio. This highlights the importance of the proposed robust approach, as opposed to the naive approach, which plugs one of the two extremes of the counterparty's intensity uncertainty interval into the valuation formulas.
Conclusions
We have developed a framework to calculate the robust XVA price process of a swap portfolio derivative transaction. We have focused on the situation where the counterparty of the investor is illiquid, i.e. that does not have a liquidly traded CDS contract. The credit default swap portfolio is hedged by the investor using defaultable bonds underwritten by the same entities referencing the single name credit default swap contracts in the portfolio. By constraining the actual default intensity to be within an uncertainty interval, we have derived lower and upper bounds for the XVA. Our analysis highlights a nontrivial interaction between the value process of the trade that accounts for all financing costs, and the closeout process that depends on the clean price of the transaction. The latter is obtained by pricing the cash flow of the trade, ignoring all other costs involved. We have shown that the value of the superhedge is obtained by switching, possible multiple times during the life of the transaction, between the lower and upper bound of the default intensity interval, depending on whether the value of the XVA hedge lies above or below the corresponding close-out value of the transaction. The difference between the superhedge and the subhedge of the XVA process is expected to increase if the traded portfolio consists of a larger number of CDS contracts.
A Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Eq. (18). First, observe that the linear BSDE (17) admits the solution given bŷ
, on the same event {t ≤ τ 1 } we have that
Note that the right hand side of the above inequality is a local martingale bounded from below (as the value process is bounded from below by the admissibility condition), and therefore is a supermartingale. Taking expectations, we conclude that We now show existence and uniqueness of a solution to ODE (33). The existence again follows from the classical Picard-Lindelöf Theorem on every continuity interval of h i 's. For simplicity of exposition we will assume that all h i 's are continuous on [0, T ]. In case, of a discontinuity, the solution will not be differentiable there, but will remain continuous.
First note thatǔ is bounded. To see this, observe thatǧ is Lipschitz in its second argument, and |ǧ(t, 0;v(t), m(t))| ≤ K 0 is uniformly bounded, by possibly increasing the constant K 0 if needed. It thus follows that
|ǧ(t,ǔ;v(t), m(t))| ≤ |ǧ(t,ǔ(t);v(t), m(t)) −ǧ(t, 0;v(t), m(t))| + |ǧ(t, 0;v(t), m(t))|
Then, assuming,ǔ is differentiable, we can employ Gronwall inequality and deduce that of
u(0) = 0, thenǔ(t) ≤ K 1 := K 0 T e K 0 T , for t ∈ [0, T ]. Similar for the lower bound, if
u(0) = 0, from which it follows thatǔ(t) ≥ −K 1 . We would have been done, if not for the assumption of differentiability needed for the Gronwall inequality. Fortunately, by the classical Picard-Lindelöf Theorem the solution to eq. (22) exists on some interval [0, T 0 ), ×[−K 1 − 1, K 1 + 1] that is for t ∈ [0, T 0 ) it holds that |ǔ(t)| ≤ K 1 + 1, and it is unique there. This time, we are guaranteed differentiability. Assume by contradiction that it cannot be extended (to the right) beyond T 0 and that T 0 < T (the same argument applies, if T 0 = T , but the solution cannot be extended to the closed interval [0, T ]). Then by Corollary II.3.2 of Hartman (2001) we have that lim t→T 0 |ǔ(t)| = K 1 + 1. We now reach a contradiction, by employing Gronwall inequality argument above that shows that |ǔ| ≤ K 1 .
Proof of Proposition 5.1. As the filtration F is trivial, the F-BSDE is in fact an ODE. The existence and uniqueness to this ODE is shown in Proposition 5.3. The equivalence of the full G-BSDEs and the reduced F-BSDEs follows from the projection result (Crépey and Song, 2015, Theorem 4.3) as condition (A) in their paper is satisfied by our assumptions on the filtrations and their Condition (J) is also satisfied (as the terminal condition does not depend onZ,Z I andZ C ). Finally, by the martingale representation theorems with respect to F and G (see (Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2001 , Section 5.2); their required assumptions are satisfied because our intensities are bounded), the solution of our BSDEs and those of the martingale problems considered in Crépey and Song (2015) coincide.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. First, note that similar to the proof of Proposition 5.3, the functionsǔ * anď u * , defined as the solutions to the ODEs in (34) exist and are unique. This follows from the fact that the functions g * and g * are Lipschitz continuous in all arguments.
Assume, by contradiction, that there exists T 0 ≤ T for whichǔ * (T 0 ) <ǔ(T 0 ), and set T 1 = sup {t ≤ T 0 |ǔ * (t) ≥ǔ(t)} . We have that T 1 is well defined, and T 1 ≥ 0, becauseǔ * (0) =ǔ(0) = 0 anď u * (t) <ǔ(t) for t ∈ (T 1 , T 0 ). Using the fact that (h It follows that there exists an > 0, such thatǔ * (t) ≥ǔ(t) for t ∈ [T 1 , T 1 + ]. This contradicts the assumption, and proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.9. The proof of the superhedging strategies is done by induction over |J|, i.e., the cardinality of J. Without loss of generality, we may assume γ ∈ {1, −1}. We present the proof for γ = 1, as this is identical to the case γ = −1. For notational convenience, we drop the superscript γ. If |J| = N − 1, the thesis follows directly from Theorem 5.5. By induction over the cardinality of |J|, assume that the result holds in case of when the entities in the set J have not defaulted yet, with |J| = n + 1 ≥ 1. Next, we prove the result for the case when the set J of entities that have not defaulted yet has cardinality n. Fix such a set J for which |J| = n. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists T 0 ≤ T for whichǔ (J), * (T 0 ) <ǔ(T 0 ), and set T 1 = sup t ≤ T 0 |ǔ (J), * (t) ≥ǔ(t) . Then, T 1 is well defined, and T 1 ≥ 0 sinceǔ (J), * (0) =ǔ(0) = 0 andǔ (J), * (t) <ǔ(t) for t ∈ (T 1 , T 0 ). Denote ,C} µ i , and the induction hypothesis for sets of cardinality n + 1. This implies that there exists a constant > 0, such thať u * (t) ≥ǔ(t) for t ∈ [T 1 , T 1 + ]. This leads to a contradiction, and hence the theorem is proven.
